My research develops a unified hyperintensional semantics and logic for a Language of
Thought (LoT). Just as the material sciences have devised methods for refining the raw
materials of the natural world, philosophical logic employs model theory and proof theory in
order to engineer the concepts that are better fit for theory building. In addition to these
traditional methods, I have developed a programmatic methodology for implementing semantic
theories with the model-checker in order to rapidly prototype and explore novel
semantic theories (see software for further details, and
this handout from a recent
talk).
Foundations
Whereas logic has traditionally focused on small language fragments, I am constructing a
unified hyperintensional semantics and logic for the Language of Thought, which includes a
wide variety of logical operators with which to reason. I have developed a semantics and
logic for the following:
Constitutive explanatory ‘P is necessary for Q’, ‘P is sufficient for
Q’, ‘P just is for Q’
Counterfactual conditionals ‘If P were the case, Q would be the case’
Causal explanatory ‘P causes Q’
Relevance and subject-matter operators ‘P is wholly relevant to Q’
Tense operators ‘It always will be P’, ‘It always was P’, ‘It
will be P’
Modal operators ‘It is possible that P’, ‘It is necessary that P’
Boolean operators
In addition to the operators above, I aim to include epistemic operators for reasoning under
uncertainty as well as normative operators for reasoning about relative values and
imperatives to support alignment with other agents. For instance, here are some of the
operators that I intend to include:
Epistemic modals ‘It must be that’ and ‘It might be that’
Indicative conditionals ‘If P is the case, then Q is the case’
Knowledge ‘S knows that P’ and ‘S knows how to P’
Belief ‘S believes that P’ (relative to a credence threshold)
Default reasoning ‘Typically, P’ and ‘Usually, P’
Probability ‘It is probably the case that’ (relative to a confidence threshold)
Comparative probability ‘P is more likely than Q’
Group knowledge ‘It is common knowledge that P’
Deontic modals ‘It ought to be that’, ‘It is permissible that’,
‘It is forbidden that’
Reason for ‘P is a reason for Q’
Defeat ‘P defeats Q as a reason’
Preference ‘P is better than Q’, ‘P is equally good as Q’
Ability ‘S can bring it about that P’
Responsibility ‘S is responsible for it being the case that P’
Collective ‘Group G is jointly responsible for it being the case that P’
Given a unified semantics for the LoT operators, logical consequences may be evaluated using
formal methods as demonstrated by the model-checker. By contrast, attempting to
develop a unified semantics and logic without implementing the semantics programmatically
makes evaluating logical consequences impractical to carry out by traditional methods,
writing semantic proofs by hand. See software for further details on
the programmatic methodology that I have developed to support the development of a unified
semantics and logic for the LoT operators.
Verification
In addition to providing a unified semantic framework for interpreting LoT operators, I am
working to unify the logics employed in formal methods by identifying the following as
subsystems that may be expressed in the LoT:
Hoare and separation logics: (Hoare 1969, 1997), (Reynolds 2002)
In addition to modeling system behavior and verifying software, this project is motivated by
applications in AI safety. In analogy, formal verification is to generative AI as the
critical mind is to the creative. By working to integrate these counterpoising elements, I
aim to contribute to the development of trustworthy AI systems that will support rather than
thwart a safe digital future.
Interpretability
In order to assist efforts to maintain the alignment of AI-assisted decision-making in
socially and morally sensitive sectors, this project develops a semantic methodology to
bridge the divide between the opaque parameters of an AI model and the transparent
determinations and inferences that may be carried out in human-readable object languages.
Rather than directly interpreting model parameters, the approach constructs semantic models
(in the sense of model theory) from AI model abstractions in order to evaluate
human-readable object languages with counterfactual, causal, relevance, and constitutive
explanatory operators — exploring the complex dependencies within AI models and clarifying
responses to edge cases relevant to model robustness. Given models trained on specific
datasets — DNA sequences, weather, and so on — methods for extracting meaningful
counterfactuals and causal hypotheses may provide powerful new methodologies with
applications across the sciences.
Integrating tense and modal operators enables this approach to capture the dynamic aspects
of AI decision-making, explaining how outputs evolve over time or respond to initial
conditions. Normative explanatory, epistemic, indicative-conditional, free-choice, and
deontic modal operators provide further resources for surveying and maintaining alignment
with human values.
The semantic models constructed from AI model abstractions may be thought of as an abstract
form of memory. By interpreting human-readable object languages, logical reasoning may be
carried out in those languages by appealing either to a semantic theory of logical
consequence or to a corresponding proof system. I am especially interested in designing
architectures that allow for dynamic feedback between an AI model and the semantic models
over which human-readable object languages are interpreted. This feedback loop resembles
human perception, which both shapes and is shaped by an agent's beliefs, allowing for belief
revision given sufficient counter-evidence: just as perceptual modules inform higher
cognitive reasoning without complete transparency — one does not need to know why a hand
appears as a hand to identify it as such — a semantic methodology mediates between the
opaque parameters of an AI model and the transparent patterns of reasoning articulated in a
human-readable object language.
Forthcoming
The Construction of Possible Worlds
Benjamin Brast-McKie · Journal of Philosophical Logic (forthcoming)
This paper presents the Logic for Tense and Modality (TM), which completely axiomatizes the class of non-deterministic dynamical systems, providing resources for reasoning about past and future contingency. By taking world states to be total configuration states for a system, the task relation encodes the possible transitions between world states over a duration.
Given a model of the bimodal language, sentences are evaluated at a possible world and time, where each possible world is a function from durations to world states constrained by the task relation. By contrast with two-dimensional semantic theories which take both times and worlds to be primitive, the perpetuity principle that what is sometimes the case is possible is a theorem in TM.
Benjamin Brast-McKie · Journal of Philosophical Logic, vol. 54, pp. 533–574 (2025)
This paper extends Kit Fine's truthmaker framework to provide a novel semantics for tensed counterfactual conditionals. Instead of taking possible worlds to be primitive elements in a model, possible worlds are defined in terms of states, parthood, and tasks, where the latter encode the possible transitions between states.
Rather than invoking primitive similarity or imposition relations, possible worlds are compared at a time independent of that time's past and future, where the comparison is carried out in mereological and modal terms. After reviewing the motivations for this approach, I provide the hyperintensional semantics for counterfactuals that is implemented in the model-checker software, then extend the language to include tense operators in order to analyze forwards, backwards, and backtracking counterfactuals.
Benjamin Brast-McKie · Journal of Philosophical Logic, vol. 50, pp. 1471–1503 (2021)
This paper develops a theory of propositional identity which distinguishes necessarily equivalent propositions that differ in subject-matter. Rather than forming a Boolean lattice as in extensional and intensional semantic theories, the space of propositions forms a non-interlaced bilattice.
After motivating a departure from tradition by way of a number of plausible principles for subject-matter, I provide a Finean state semantics for a novel theory of propositions, presenting arguments against the convexity and nonvacuity constraints which Fine introduces. I then compare the resulting logic of propositional identity (PI₁) with Correia's logic of generalised identity (GI), as well as the first degree fragment of Angell's logic of analytic containment (AC). The paper concludes by extending PI₁ to include axioms and rules for a subject-matter operator.
Extends the standard methodology in semantics with programmatic tools that rapidly prototype semantic theories, reduce cognitive load, facilitate collaboration, and increase accessibility. The model-checker draws on the Z3 SMT solver to find hyperintensional countermodels and establish validity over models up to a user-specified level of complexity.
A Complete Logic of Ground I: Unilateral Propositions
Benjamin Brast-McKie · Review of Symbolic Logic
A proposition is specific just in case there is exactly one way for that proposition to obtain, and one proposition grounds another just in case every way for the former to obtain is a way for the latter to obtain. This paper provides a proof system for a unilateral logic of ground with a specificity operator, establishing soundness and completeness over a state semantics in which propositions are sets of states closed under finite fusion.
A Complete Logic of Ground II: Bilateral Propositions
Benjamin Brast-McKie · Review of Symbolic Logic
Having established soundness and completeness for a unilateral logic of ground with a specificity operator in a previous paper, this paper extends these results to a bilateral logic where propositions are closed under infinite fusion. By contrast with the Boolean lattices described by extensional and intensional logics, the space of bilateral propositions forms a non-interlaced bilattice. I conclude by defining the bilateral notions of essence and ground in terms of unilateral ground.
This paper develops a hyperintensional semantic theory for past-tense causal claims such as 'Throwing the stone caused the window to break' and 'The fuse blowing caused the fire to start'. Consideration of where David Lewis' accounts fail to capture common usage motivates an extension of Kit Fine's state semantics that is better able to encode the explanatory relationships between events. After employing the resulting semantic theory to analyse a number of important causal scenarios, the paper concludes by presenting objections and possible extensions to the framework.
Fundamentality and the Self
Benjamin Brast-McKie
This paper investigates the nature of the self. In particular, I seek to regiment the Upanishadic claim 'sa esa neti netyatma' (NA), which Olivelle translates as 'About this self (atman), one can only say not—, not—.' After presenting the context of the Śakalya Dialogue from the Brihadaranyaka Upanishad in which this claim first occurs, I regiment NA by means of a second-order principle: for any way of being, being that way does not strictly ground what it is to be the self (atman).
It follows that the self is fundamental on account of failing to have any strict grounds. I conclude by examining the relationship between the fundamentality of the self and the nature of the absolute (brahman).